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Käsittelemme mobiiliverkkojen avaintenhallinnan ja käyttäjän autentikoinnin ongelmaa, joka negatiivisesti
vaikuttaa handoverin tehokkuuteen, lisää systeemin kuormaa mm. avainten neuvottelun ja jakelun ja
autentikoinnin ansiosta. Tarkoituksemme on parantaa avaintenhallinen tehokkuutta ja samalla vähentää
kasvavia sijoituspaineita ydinverkkoelementteihin. Vastaamme näihin ongelmiin onnistuneesti. Uusi SKC
(Session Keys Context) -avaintenhallintamenetelmämme on paras löytämiemme joukossa vähentämään
signalointikuormaa ja tekemään verkon liikkuvuudenhallinnan riippumattomaksi tukiaseman ja
avaintenjakelijan välisestä linkin viiveestä, olettaen että jokaiselle tukiasemalle vaaditaan erilliset avaimet. Se
on merkittävä kontribuutio mobiiliverkkojen avaintenhallintaan nopean liikkuvuudenhallinnan kanssa
verkoissa, joissa vaaditaan erilliset avaimet jokaiselle tukiasemalle. SKC:llä on myös monia hyödyllisiä
sovelluksia.
Meidän lähettäjän ja vastaanottajan identiteettiin sidottu avaintenneuvotteluprotokollamme symmetristen
avainten kanssa on uusi ja analoginen identiteettiin pohjautuvan kryptografian (Identity Based Cryptography ,
IBC) kanssa. Se on yleistys SKC:n käyttämästä identiteetin sitomisesta. Lisäksi meidän hajautettu AAA
arkkitehtuurimme SKC:n, sertifikaattien ja laitteistopohjaisen tietoturvan kanssa on disruptiivinen ehdotus ja
näyttää miten äärimmillään mobiiliverkkojen avaintenjakelija voidaan hajauttaa verkon reunaelementteihin.
Meidän kvantitatiivinen analyysimme ja vertailu SKC:n ja LTE:n avaintenhallinnan välillä on uutta, eikä sitä ole
nähty aikaisemmin. Tutkimuksemme vaikutti LTE tietoturvan standardointiin ja kontribuoi kotitukiasemien
kehitykseen ja tutkimukseen, sekä kommuuni- ja kaupunki WiFi verkkojen langattomiin tukiasemiin.
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1 Introduction
Mobile wireless access networks are common around the world, mobile devices
are spreading from country to country, and people are using their devices more and
more to access Internet web services. Operators'investments in wireless network
infrastructures are huge, and the regulators and users require protection for the
data that is consumed and exchanged over the wireless networks.
Consequently operators do not want to let users access their networks unless they are
paying customers, and users do not want to send their personal information over the
air without protection or pay for something that they have not bought or agreed
to pay. On the other hand, malicious users want to access the network for free,
or anonymously, or masquerading as other users, etc. In short there are multiple
incentives to provide access control and data protection for wireless access networks,
but also to minimize the eﬀects of compromised network nodes or systems, especially
on the edge of the network where the wireless access points may reside in public or
home environments. As a result the wireless networks require user authentication
and session key management for protecting the signaling and user data.
In this dissertation we focus on session key management for wireless access networks.
There are multiple definitions for key management. Internet RFC 4949 defines
it as follows: “The process of handling keying material during its life cycle in a
cryptographic system; and the supervision and control of that process” [108]. NIST
defines it as, “The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other
related security parameters (e.g., IVs, counters) during the entire life cycle of the
keys, including their generation, storage, distribution, entry and use, deletion or
destruction, and archiving” [89, 90], and while the Open System Interconnection
Reference Model (OSI/RM) describes it in the following way: “The generation,
storage, distribution, deletion, archiving and application of keys in accordance with
a security policy” [53].
In this dissertation, however, we use the term key management to mean the mecha-
nisms and rules for creating, distributing, deriving, and using cryptographical keys
resulting from an authentication procedure, and we limit it to the scope of mo-
bile networks (e.g., GSM [104, 3], UMTS [58, 2, 88], WLAN (802.11) [52], LTE
[106, 5], WiMAX (802.16) [11, 51]) that consists of Mobile Nodes (MN); Access
Points (AP); Key Distributors (KD); and an Authentication Server (AS). MNs are
mobile devices which have a common radio technology with the APs and, while
moving, make handoﬀs from one AP to another. A simple reference architecture is
given in Figure 1.12.
2In cellular networks the AP is named as radio Base Station (BS), NodeB, or evolved NodeB
(eNB), the mobile node as User Equipment (UE) or Mobile Terminal (MT), authentication server
such as Home Subscriber Server (HSS), and the key distributor is assigned to some other network
node like Mobile Management Entity (MME) in LTE, or Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) in
UMTS and GSM
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Figure 1.1: Mobile access network reference architecture
1.1 Research Setting
“Computer scientists and engineers focus on information, on the ways
of representing and processing information, and on the machines and
systems that perform these tasks.” [29] (p. 19)
The problem is that the key management and authentication in mobile networks
negatively aﬀects the handoﬀ performance, increases time critical overhead in the
handoﬀ, and adds overhead to the system in terms of key exchange signaling, au-
thentication, and key distribution. The goal is to find more eﬃcient and secure
mobile network key management scheme(s), and to distribute the key distributor
functionality to the edges to allow higher key distributor scalability without losing
security. In this way the cost and energy eﬃciency of the key management subsys-
tem is improved by reducing investment pressure on core network elements. Cost
eﬃciency is very important for mobile cellular network operators as the cellular
subscription costs for the end users are going down while the data rates are increas-
ing e.g., with 3G modems for laptops. Energy eﬃciency is also an important issue
especially now that global warming has become a worldwide problem.
By key management eﬃciency we mean that the key management adds minimal
delay to the time critical part of the handoﬀ process and in general to the whole
system. By distribution we mean that the key management load of the KD can be
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shared with other network elements. By scalability we mean that the KD is able to
serve more APs and MNs with the same computing and signaling resources.
Key management load includes a number of real-time and non-real-time signaling
messages and their processing time. However, we also want to take into account the
key management performance requirements set for the network. These include the
signaling delay and response time between APs and the KD. Other aspects when
evaluating the key management schemes include flexibility in adapting to diﬀerent
types of network deployments and architectures, where signaling delays and links
vary.
Vertical handoﬀs or intersystem mobility issues are outside of the scope of this dis-
sertation. Also sensor, ad-hoc, and vehicular networks are not considered. Asym-
metric key cryptography is not within the focus of this dissertation as it is still
considered too heavy-weight for time critical handoﬀs. Generally, enabling fast
handoﬀs is a wider common research theme in mobile networks that includes radio
level signaling optimizations, handoﬀ predictions, resource pre-allocations, etc.
When evaluating the results we answer questions, like “Does the idea provide a
new and more useful capability or greater functionality?” or “Is it faster or more
eﬃcient?” [28]. Thus, the research methodology is a constructive engineering
approach to the problem. We find and explore new solutions and ways of reaching
the goal and solving the problem. We compare and analyze the results with previous
work and quantify and simulate them.
The nature of the problem does not necessarily require validation with prototyping.
Security analysis itself helps to understand the overall eﬀects of key management
solutions in the system and to evaluate the diﬀerent security properties. Measuring
the eﬀects for system performance and load distribution is also hard, but with
analytic comparison and quantitative analysis in relation to related art, general
eﬀects can be estimated and concluded.
1.2 Contributions
The dissertation addresses three critical aspects of mobile network key management:
distributed and handover eﬃcient key management, decentralized authentication,
authorization, and accounting (AAA) architecture, and using key derivations to
achieve key separation.
Publications I, II, and IV discuss about the key management techniques used
in mobile networks, especially in the latest mobile network technology called LTE,
while Publication III concentrates on link layer security issues of the LTE.
Publication V further distributes the key management for mobile networks by
utilizing the results in Publication II and decentralizing AAA architecture to the
edge of the network.
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Publication VI generalizes the identity binding mechanisms with similar key deriva-
tions used in SKC (Publication II ) and explores the Identity Based Cryptography
(IBC) field.
The main contributions of the dissertation, and of each publication, are the following:
1. Novel distributed and scalable mobile network key management technique
called Session Keys Context (SKC) and its comparison with LTE [5]
(a) Publication II describes a new scalable and flexible key management
protocol for mobile networks called Session Keys Context (SKC), and
analyses and compares it with three other key management protocols.
It describes and analyses the results of a simple simulation that compares
key request and SKC key management mechanisms together within a
cellular (UMTS) radio stack.
The SKC is flexible and can be used to maintain balance between mem-
ory consumption and handoﬀ time critical signaling load. It removes
the link delay factor between the Access Points and the Key Distributor
from the time critical handoﬀs.
(b) Publication III lists new security threats to the LTE radio including
several user tracking attacks based on signaling messages, and an active
service theft attack based on false buﬀer status reports.
It proposes solutions to the diﬀerent problems in order to mitigate the
identified security threats to the LTE radio.
(c) Publication IV describes and analyses the LTE Security architecture
and key management [5], and compares and quantifies the LTE key
management with the SKC.
It discusses implementation alternatives for the LTE key management
that maintain compliancy with the LTE over-the-air interface specifica-
tion.
2. Simple symmetric key establishment protocol with implicit authentication
(a) Publication V explores the identity based asymmetric cryptography
and applies it with symmetric keys.
It describes a new key establishment protocol that provides implicit
authentication based on sender ID, receiver ID, or both sender and re-
ceiver ID binding. It uses similar key derivations asymmetrically as in
Publication II with SKC.
It provides high-level use cases for the protocol, e.g., creating keys for
Operations & Management server clients from a root key and client
identity, and partial IP packet level authentication with the help of
Domain Name System (DNS) [78, 79, 80, 81].
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3. Decentralized AAA architecture
(a) Publication VI explores the distribution of a AAA system to the edges
of the network without violating the requirements put on the AAA sys-
tems.
It describes a new distributed AAA architecture based on common hard-
ware security and certificates.
It describes at high level a community based network access control with
user reputation and participation.
The system utilizes the SKC solution described in Publication II for
allowing access routers to act as AAA servers and clients, and achieving
a scalable distributed AAA system.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
on key management requirements and techniques in mobile networks and also lists
some cryptographical building blocks used in key management. The contributions
of this dissertation are discussed in Chapter 3, and the conclusions with summary
in Chapter 4.
The published contributions are presented at the end in separate chapters, Fast
solutions to AP-to-AP handoﬀs in Publication I, Protected Session Keys Context
for Distributed Session Key Management in Publication II, Enhancing Security and
Privacy in 3GPP E-UTRAN Radio Interface in Publication III, LTE Key Manage-
ment Comparison with Session Keys Context in Publication IV, Use cases of Im-
plicit Authentication and Key Establishment with Sender and Receiver ID Binding
in Publication V, and Secure Distributed AAA with Domain and User Reputation
in Publication VI.
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2 Key Management Requirements and Mechanisms
2.1 Key Management Requirements for Mobile Networks
There are multiple requirements for key management for mobile networks. The In-
ternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has created a best current practice document
(RFC4962) [45] that describes requirements or guidance for Authentication, Autho-
rization, and Accounting (AAA) [109] key management [30]. IETF has also criteria
for evaluating AAA protocols for network access [8]. Also, both WLAN (IEEE
802.11) and WiMAX (IEEE 802.16) follow similar guidelines in their specifications.
On the cellular side of the world, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
has defined general security requirements and architectures for the cellular networks
like GSM, UMTS, and LTE [1, 4, 7, 5, 6].
The main threat for handover key management is key compromise (e.g., an attacker
attacks against an AP to get the keys out of it). To mitigate this threat key sep-
aration is required in many levels. Thus, security requirements for handover key
management can be summarized in terms of key separation. With key separation
we mean cryptographically separate keys where diﬀerent secret key derivation pa-
rameters used (e.g. diﬀerent secret seeds). In other words keys A and B are separate
if key B cannot be derived from key A and key B cannot be derived from key A
(based on public parameters or parameters that the key holder has, but not the
actual key to be derived). For the key derivation a Key Derivation Function (KDF)
is used. KDF must be a one-way function (e.g., a hash function like SHA256).
Partial key separation is achieved if the requirement holds only on one direction
but not to the other. In a case when K1 is used to derive K2 with a one-way key
derivation function, the property K1—| K2 holds, but not K1 |— K2 (the starting
”|” denotes that the key derivation is blocked to that direction; K1 appears in the
key chain before K2). We call this backward key separation3 as the key derivation
backward in the key chain is blocked. Forward key separation means that K1 |—
K2 holds, i.e. K1 cannot be used to derive K2. When both backward and forward
key separations apply, we can denote it as K1 |—| K2. The security requirements
put on the handover key management, can be summarized as follows:
1. Key separation between access network technologies
2. Key separation between APs
3. Key separation between MNs
4. Key separation between algorithms
3Note that this is the reverse of traditional perfect forward secrecy definition
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5. Key separation between control and user planes (i.e., signaling messages and
user data)
6. Key separation between integrity protection and ciphering
7. Key stream separation between flows and directions (up and downstream)
8. The key stream bits must always be fresh (i.e., the same key stream must
not be used twice to integrity protect or cipher the data).
Both the IETF and IEEE require that each AP must not share the same keying
material with another AP. GSM does not follow this principle as the same key is
transferred between the base stations. UMTS bypasses this requirement by intro-
ducing a middle network element above the base stations called the Radio Network
Controller (RNC) that terminates the signaling and data protection. The RNC
is typically in a physically secure place, which makes it more resistant to physical
attacks. As in GSM the RNCs transfer the same keys to the target RNC. Also, dur-
ing interworking between GSM and UMTS networks the same keys are transferred
and thus vulnerabilities in the older GSM network may be imposed to the UMTS
network, cf. [73, 72].
The newest 3GPP cellular standard LTE does not have a RNC anymore and signal-
ing and data protection termination happens in the base stations. However, LTE
has taken the approach to follow all these requirements.
2.2 Key Management Mechanisms in Mobile Networks
In this section we take a look at the related art of key management in the mobile
access networks that aim to fulfill the AAA key management requirements, i.e.,
especially on how to provide fresh keys for APs.
There are numerous papers on how to speed up re-authentications for MNs. Running
the full authentication protocol is not fast enough for handoﬀs that are time critical
(in terms of tens of milliseconds). Hard handoﬀs are time critical in the sense
that the communications channel breaks when the MN switches from the source
AP to the target AP (or from source cell to target cell). If the break is big, it
negatively aﬀects the quality of real-time services like Voice over IP. With make-
before-break handoﬀs the break can be made smaller as the target AP has been
prepared before the actual radio break happens, but the break still remains. The
target is to make the handoﬀ as fast as possible and avoid losing any data packets
due to the handoﬀ. Since the full authentication protocol run requires signaling to
the home Authentication Server (AS) from the access network, the performance is
not good enough due to the multiple links and round trips. Also, the load on the AS
increases per number of handoﬀs and MNs and thus is not scalable. The target is to
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make the key management scalable with minimum eﬀects on the (critical) handoﬀ
signaling time.
When the MN registers on an access network it authenticates itself to the home
network (1994) [82]. Typically the home network AS creates a master session key
based on the authentication result and derives a further key to be sent to the access
network where the MN resides. In the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
key management framework [9] the access network element that gets this key and
sends it further to the APs is called Key Distributor (KD) or Key Distribution
Center (KDC). The EAP key management framework is a common framework for
key management optimizations in the related art along with the WLAN network
(802.1X [50]). The MN specific key in the KD is then used as a basis for localized
authentications between the access network and the MN. The MN specific key in
the KD may also be called root key in the key hierarchy for local key management.
2.2.1 Key Request
Key Request is the simplest form of session key delivery to the AP. The AP sends
a key request to the KD when the MN handoﬀs to it. The KD creates a fresh AP
specific session key according to the AAA key management guideline and delivers
it to the new AP. A modified mechanism can be used for cases where the handover
signaling goes through a centralized element providing the KD functionality (for
example a WLAN switch or the MME in EPS). In this case, the source AP sends a
key request to the KD along with other mobility signaling, but the KD then sends
a fresh key to the target base station, instead of to the source base station. LTE
uses this modified key request scheme in S1 handovers and a normal key request
mechanism in X2 handovers, except that in X2 handovers the fresh key is used in
the next handover and not in the current handover.
One of the newest key-request based protocols is EAP Re-authentication Protocol
(ERP) (2008) [85], which originates from the IETF Handover Keying (HOKEY)
working group[27]. Xiao and Sarikaya describe some use cases for the ERP (2009)
[119] and Marin et al. analyzed and found a replay protection weakness in the
HOKEY proposal before the ERP was finalized in (2009) [70].
The key management related delay to the handoﬀ consists of key distribution and
authentication, i.e., deriving and getting the right keys to the target AP and taking
them into use with the MN. There are proposals to further speed up the handoﬀ
by moving the key distribution and part of the authentication away from the time
critical handoﬀ-signaling phase. On the other hand, the key request scheme requires
a fast KD and a fast link between the KD and the APs, which impacts the network
architecture and deployment scenarios. Also, the KD needs to be properly protected
from outsiders (compare to WLAN switch).
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2.2.2 Pre-distribution
In a pre-distribution (or pre-emptive keying) (2003-2004) [12, 75, 77, 60] scenario
the KD derives AP specific session keys and distributes them to a number of APs
when MN has successfully attached itself to the access network. The specific APs
and the number of them included in the pre-distribution scheme can vary (i.e., a
certain group of APs) (2004) [77]. This scenario makes the handoﬀ faster as the
key is already in the target AP, provided it was in the distribution group of the
pre-distribution algorithm.
The main disadvantage of the pre-distribution scheme is that it increases signaling
between KD and APs. Also, the KD needs to pre-distribute the keys to the multiple
neighboring APs of the MN's current AP, altough the MN may never visit the
neighboring APs the keys were pre-distributed to. This way the resources in the
APs are wasted and depend on the number of registered MNs in the area. Mishra
et al. (2004) [76] use context pre-distribution to the neighboring APs from the
current AP using neighbor graphs that are generated by the system itself based on
handoﬀs. For example, IETF CXTP [65, 69] and IEEE IAPP [49] protocols can
be used between the APs to do the context pre-distribution. The context transfer
between APs requires security associations. This is easily handled in intra-domain
handoﬀ, but for handoﬀs between diﬀerent domains, security associations require
co-operation between domain administrators. Bargh et al. (2004) [18] explore this
problem space further for intersystem handoﬀs. Kassab et al. (2008) [61] simulate
key pre-distribution with context transfers between APs and conclude that it better
supports high velocity MNs compared to the centralized key distribution method
from the KD. This may be due to the distributed load to the APs compared to the
KD load. However, this depends on the network architecture, i.e., link capacities,
propagation delays, and the number of APs per KD.
Prasad and Wang (2005) [103] use a roaming key (RK), derived from the root key
to do authentication between the MN and the AP. This way the 802.11i security
requirements are met as the RK is used for authentication only and the other derived
keys for integrity and confidentiality protection. They do not describe how the
roaming key is created from the root key (PMK in 802.11i terms).
Hong et al. (2006) [43] use a two-step hash key chain to create new keys from
the root key in the KD for new APs. The scheme provides both backward and
forward key separation. However, the problem with their setup is that the MN
and the network may get out of sync in the key chain derivations, as there are no
sequence number indications between the network and the MN. Error identification
and recovery is needed. The Hong et al. scheme uses pre-distribution to neighboring
APs, but additionally each neighboring AP sends a key request to the KD, increasing
the signaling load of the KD significantly. The signaling is multiplied in every
handoﬀ because the neighboring APs need to get a new key from the KD after each
handoﬀ and cannot use the key they got after the previous handoﬀ. This is a serious
weakness in their paper from the KD scalability point of view.
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2.2.3 Optimistic Access
Aura and Roe describe a method they call optimistic access (2005) [16] in which
the network delivers a ticket to the MN. The MN then uses the ticket as a tempo-
rary authentication key to get access before the normal authentication procedure
is finished with regard to the target AP. This resembles ticket-based methods like
the Kerberos (1987) [74, 86] protocol. Ohba and Dutta describe a kerberized han-
dover keying method (2007) [93] in which they also send a ticket to the target AP.
Komarova and Riguidel (2007) [63] continue with the same mechanism and use the
tickets for fast inter-system roaming and also let the home network provide multiple
tickets to multiple visited networks at the same time for the MN.
Kassab et al. (2007) [59] extend the 802.11i key management with a ticket based
proactive authentication scheme, where the MN gets a list of neighboring APs from
the serving AP and then creates temporary tickets for them. MN sends all the
tickets to the serving AP, which then distributes them to the neighboring APs.
In a handover the target AP and the MN share a secret that they can use for
authentication.
The mechanisms that increase the over-the-air signaling have weaknesses like the
complexity of the MN implementation increase, smaller battery life, and increased
interoperability testing complexity between terminal and network vendors.
2.2.4 Pre-authentication
Pack and Choi (2002) [94] introduce a pre-authentication (2002 - 2009) [94, 91,
92, 95, 110] mechanism where the MN authenticates to multiple APs through a
single AP. This way the MN can pre-establish SKs with multiple neighboring APs.
This makes the next handoﬀ fast as the keys are already established. However, the
MN may have to run pre-authentication with multiple APs as it is not certain which
AP the MN will handoﬀ next to. It increases over-the-air signaling (battery life)
and AP-to-AP interfaces. Pre-authentication suits well with intersystem handoﬀs,
as the source, and target systems may not support the same key management or
authentication mechanisms.
Chien et al. (2008) [26] describe a fast pre-authentication procedure that uses a hash
key chain on the KD to create new root keys for target APs. They bind the new
target AP key with the link layer addresses of the MN and the target AP, but also
add both the MN selected and target AP selected nonces. However, these nonces
are not necessary as the hash key chain ensures a fresh key for every handoﬀ. Chien
et al. do not find any other reason to use the nonces. Their paper also describes the
use of the KD to create a sealed target AP key that is sent to the current AP. The
KD seals the secret for the target AP with a target AP specific shared secret. The
KD also sends the same secret to the source AP, which can then use this secret to
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encrypt the current session key. When the source AP sends the encrypted session
key and the sealed target AP secret to the target AP, the target AP is able to unseal
the secret and use it to decrypt the session key. This is something similar to what
we proposed in our Publication II earlier than Chien. In addition their proposal
requires signaling with the KD for each handoﬀ, and seems to be time critical since
the MN already knows the target AP identity and no other pre-authentications are
done to other APs.
Tseng et al. (2005) [115] propose to use the Global Positionin System (GPS) to pre-
dict the next WLAN AP for handoﬀ. However, GPS is not accurate enough (or even
unusable) indoors where WLANs are used. What is more, mobility patterns may
provide a better estimate of the possible neighboring APs that should be included in
the neighboring list. However, GPS could possibly bring some benefit in estimating
the next handoﬀ in large cellular networks where cell sizes are geographically large
and high velocity MNs have GPS enabled. On the other hand, for fast speed trains,
mobility patterns or even just network topology configuration may be simpler.
Our Publication II discusses and compares the key request, pre-distribution, and
pre-authentication key management methods further in detail and contrasts them
with our new session keys context mechanism.
2.2.5 Public key based
Public key based methods are traditionally not considered because asymmetric
cryptographical operations (like decrypting and signing with a secret key of the
public key pair) are considered computationally too heavy for mobile devices and
radios in which handovers are very time critical. However, public keys can be used
for initially authenticating the user and/or terminal [31, 32].
Kim et al. (2007) [62] describe identity based cryptography (IBC) [107] based au-
thentication protocol for mobile networks between MN and AP. Their protocol re-
quires four pairings in elliptic curves and the estimated total time in their example
dedicated hardware is 5ms for all four operations. However, dedicated hardware is
an additional cost to MN terminals, and also if not run in parallel with other radio
handoﬀ procedures is too costly from the total handoﬀ time budget.
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3 Improving and Distributing Key Management for
Mobile Networks
In this chapter we analyze the contributions of this thesis and highlight the benefits
and limitations for mobile network key management. We also contrast the contribu-
tions with recent advancements in the research area, and evaluate the results. We
start with Publication I and go through all the publications of this thesis.
3.1 Session Keys Context, a Novel Key Management Technique
3.1.1 Fast Solutions to AP-to-AP Handoﬀs
Summary and contributions. Publication I describes some existing mobility and
key management mechanisms for mobile networks and proposes a new approach for
authenticated handoﬀs between APs based on public keys, pre-authentication, and
public key caches. Each MN has a public key pair that is used to authenticate the
MN for the access network. Optionally, the access network or the AP also has a
public key or public key certificate for authentication between APs and even for the
MN. The MN and the AP are authenticated before the actual handoﬀ to reduce the
time critical signaling during the handoﬀ procedure.
Related art. The paper refers to authentication mechanisms in two Mobile IP
[96, 97, 98, 100, 56] extensions, i.e., in Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6)[64],
in Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [111], and in their combination called Fast
handover in Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (F-HMIPv6) [57]. All work together with AAA
infrastructures [39, 99] that use shared secrets. After that the paper refers to the
Kerberos [74] and AP-to-AP credential [16] that both use the MN to deliver keying
material or the authorization token for the target AP for successful handoﬀ. Then
the paper refers to localized authentications based on diﬀerent key management
mechanisms, namely the key pre-distribution [77, 60] and predictive authentication
(or pre-authentication)[94]. Finally the paper refers to authentication between APs
[69, 49], meaning that the source AP transfers the keys to the target AP. Note that
transferring the same keys to the target AP does not fulfill the AAA key management
requirement [45] of having separate keys for diﬀerent APs.
Discussion and evaluation. The paper uses the term password based authenti-
cation to mean shared secret based authentication, but this is not critical as the
password at high level is a shared secret.
The usage of public keys allows the bypassing of the centralized AAA infrastructure
when authenticating the user but requires a public key infrastructure (PKI). How-
ever, using only the public keys leaves out the authorization and accounting parts.
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On what basis should the authenticated users be authorized to access the network
resources? Also, the question arises of how to manage the accounting, i.e., where
should the accounting records be stored or sent to? With only PKI infrastructure
these are not possible, the AAA infrastructure is also needed. They can be merged
of course.
Authorization could be managed on the access network and based on local rules, e.g.,
based on general contextual information like time and date, but also on user specific
history information. From this perspective, Publication VI is a nice follow-up to
Publication I and discusses user and domain reputation, i.e., history information
about the users. Also, Publication VI discusses AP specific public key certificates,
similarly to Publication I, that can be used to authenticate APs to each other. Pub-
lication II continues to address the problem statement of improving and distributing
key management for mobile networks by describing a new solution.
Accounting is more diﬃcult without a home AAA server as there is no way then to
send accounting records to a certain user's home network, and thus no entity to send
charging records to. Accounting for network access could be simplified if (capped)
flat rate charging models become dominant. But then all regulatory requirements for
operator networks may not be fulfilled. When public key certificates are considered,
the certificate could contain information about where to send the accounting data.
But in general the accounting considerations are not the focus of this dissertation
as it is a more separate functionality compared to authentication and authorization
and happens after them.
From a mobility perspective, the MN must be reachable by corresponding nodes by
some means, e.g., by having a home agent [98], anchor point [36, 23], or rendezvous
point [83, 66]. These all tend to support network architectures where users have a
(virtual) home network, or at least an initial and valid contact point when reach-
ability is required (e.g., compare to oﬄine and online MNs). This is more aligned
with AAA infrastructures.
The comparison between the mobility schemes and associated key management
methods could have been deeper and more towards quantitative analysis and com-
parison. There are many issues, as already discussed above, that the paper does not
take into account, but which are important when considering the proposal to use
public keys. However, the paper identifies the key part of the problem statement of
this dissertation and introduces key related-art.
This paper oﬀers some building blocks for achieving the goals of this dissertation.
Namely, using the certificates for AP authentication in the network, which is ad-
dressed more thoroughly in Publication VI. The mechanism outlined in this paper for
pre-authenticated handoﬀs does not improve the handoﬀ performance compared to
other pre-authentication methods as the authentication protocol itself is not compu-
tationally more eﬃcient than when using shared keys based authentication methods.
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However, as stated in the paper, the public key based authentication method can
be easily used to cross the boundaries of network operators.
Notes. The rest of the publications in this dissertation do not consider public key
cryptography as a way to do key management for mobile networks as it is considered
computationally too heavy-weight and unnecessarily complex for creating session
keys in each handoﬀ. For authentication, public keys can be considered e.g., such
as in TLS [32], but for time-critical handoﬀs, even with pre-authentication, doing
public key operations with every handoﬀ is not computationally eﬃcient enough
compared to symmetric key cryptography. However, with a dedicated hardware
public key cryptography may become a viable option for handoﬀs from a processing
speed point of view [55].
3.1.2 Protected Session Keys Context for Distributed Session Key Manage-
ment
Summary and contributions. This paper describes a new flexible and scalable
key management protocol called Session Keys Context (SKC) for mobile wireless
networks. It extensively compares SKC with three existing key management mech-
anisms, i.e., key-request, key pre-distribution, and pre-authentication. In addition
the paper shows simple simulation results for key-request and SKC mechanisms.
The SKC requires security associations between APs and the KD. For each MN the
KD then creates AP specific session keys to be used with each AP into which the
MN moves. The KD utilizes the network topology information to create multiple
AP specific session keys, encrypting them separately for each AP and sending all
the keys to the serving AP. The serving AP then finds its own encrypted session
key, decrypts it and uses it for creating further traﬃc protection keys with the MN
(e.g., with a 4-way handshake to ensure key freshness). The SKC contains multiple
keys, one for each AP in the area. When handoﬀ occurs, the source AP sends the
target AP specific SKC entry to the target AP along with all the other SKC entries.
The target AP can then decrypt the AP specific session key and use it with the
MN. The MN has a root key, which it uses together with AP identity to derive the
AP specific session key. The paper also describes a new way to extend the SKC
to also include MN specific AP-to-AP protection keys. The serving AP may also
pre-distribute keys to the neighboring APs.
Related art. There are multiple key management methods for mobile networks.
The simplest one is key-request, where each AP requests a session key from the
KD during the handoﬀ. This is most suitable for cases, where the signaling goes to
the KD in every handoﬀ, e.g., as with WLAN APs and WLAN switches. The up-
to-date related-art description of key management mechanisms is described in the
introduction section as it is the core part of the dissertation. An overview of some
of the challenges and issues for next generation systems such as LTE are discussed
in (2006) [102].
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The SKC extension to protect the AP-to-AP signaling with MN specific keys re-
sembles the Kerberos protocol, which provides tickets that can be used to decrypt
the contents. Thus, the SKC has similarities with Kerberos as it contains sealed
keys that only certain recipients can open. However, the way the session keys are
used and derived and combined in SKC is new as well as the SKC construction and
application for mobile networks.
Discussion and evaluation. The MN derives the AP specific session key during
the handoﬀ, but the KD has already derived the AP specific session keys and sent
them in the SKC to the APs. This way the SKC protocol could be described as a
partial and distributed key exchange.
The requirement of having AP specific separate session keys is not always well
justified. It is a recommendation in the AAA key management framework [45], and
as a security design principle, very good. This key separation can be categorized as
both forward and backward key separation. With forward key separation we mean
that the serving AP is not able to derive the MN's session key for the target AP.
Similarly with backward key separation we mean that the serving AP is not able to
derive MN's session key for the previous AP (provided that the current serving AP
is not the first AP the MN attached to in the network). Having separate session
keys with each AP for all MNs follows the principle that the scope of the session
key is kept minimum. Thus, if the session key is compromised in an AP, the scope
of the attack is kept to a minimum (in the area of the AP).
The simulation results of the SKC and key-request are not very interesting. The
simulation setup is quite simple and the comparison focuses mainly on the size of
the keying material that is being transferred between the APs and then also the
handoﬀ protocol. The size of the SKC is not very critical either when high-speed
backhaul links are used. The radio link scheduling shows up in the simulation as
steps on the graphs.
SKC is flexible in the sense that it can be reduced to a key-request scheme when the
KD sends only one session key to the AP, namely the session key that is used with
the current serving AP. This way the SKC contains only one entry. When the KD
increases the number of entries in the SKC, the more memory the SKC requires in
the AP, but also the more APs that are covered in the SKC. If the KD has chosen
the APs for the SKC wisely, e.g., based on user mobility patterns, there will be
no need to request new SKC entries from the KD for a long time. This way the
KD can serve more APs in the area. Also, the real-time signaling requirements for
the KD are reduced as the SKC entries can be updated before the actual handoﬀs
happen (predictive SKC updates). The paper does not address the issue of mobility
patterns and thus more optimized ways of selecting APs for the SKC. This could be
studied more. The SKC can be used to balance the memory consumption, real-time
signaling load, and general signaling load dynamically. The bigger the SKC is, the
more memory is used, and the less signaling happens with the KD.
35
When the MN moves between two APs, the same session key is used to derive traﬃc
protection keys (e.g., integrity and encryption keys, and optionally even separately
for signaling and data traﬃc). This means that the same traﬃc protection keys are
derived unless the key derivation step includes some randomized parameters. These
parameters can, for example, be a random link layer identity or exchanged nonces
between the MN and the AP. The paper mentions only nonces.
This paper is a key result in the problem scope of this dissertation. It is the cor-
nerstone of the goal to reach a more scalable and distributed key management for
mobile networks. The SKC is also a key component in Publication VI that describes
the distributed AAA architecture. The SKC symmetric key derivation mechanism
is identity based. This identity binding is further discussed in Publication V, which
presents a new authentication and key establishment protocol with implicit sender
and receiver ID binding.
3.1.3 Enhancing Security and Privacy in 3GPP E-UTRAN Radio Interface
Summary and contributions. This paper lists new security threats on the LTE
radio including several user tracking attacks based on signaling messages and an
active service theft attack based on false buﬀer status reports. The paper proposes
solutions to the diﬀerent problems to mitigate the identified security threats on the
LTE radio. The author was the editor and main contributor of this publication. The
author concentrated on the security problems and mitigations and worked together
with other co-authors to find the exact solutions.
Related art. User location privacy is an important and much discussed topic
(see e.g., Schilit et al. (2003) [105]. On the other hand, location based services
are becoming more common and a core building block for mobile applications and
services. When the user location has been identified or mapped to a device identifier,
the user or device tracking becomes an issue. Gruteser and Grunwald (2005) [40]
enhance the location privacy by proposing to use disposable link layer identifiers in
WLAN that uses static link layer identities. Huang L. et al. (2005) [46] propose
to enhance wireless location privacy by using a silent period. This means that
the station uses a random silent period before continuing communications when it
changes to a new link layer identity. Otherwise the attacker is able to correlate
between the old and new link layer identity of the same station.
Discussion and evaluation. There are lots of papers related to user privacy, but
it is outside the scope of this dissertation. The user tracking and location privacy
aspects of radio link layers are not within the scope of this dissertation, but the
security analysis of LTE radio in this publication is one part of the security work for
the LTE that the author has contributed to the community. The threat mitigations
described in the paper use key derivations to create one-time access tokens for the
link layer signaling that is not protected by the signaling protection keys. The
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token derivation proposal is part of the key management and thus relevant for this
dissertation as well.
The paper also shows that security is not perfect and that security measures like
key management mechanisms for mobile networks do not cover all security threats.
LTE uses network allocated link layer identities in contrast to e.g., 802.11 that uses
static station identities on the link layer. However, preventing user tracking based
on signaling messages is hard. This paper shows that user tracking can be done
in theory in many ways based on signaling message analysis. Related art shows
that even radio transmitter fingerprinting can be used to identify devices [114].
Some of these threats can be mitigated, but the added complexity and the required
specification and implementation time of the mitigation solutions may not be worth
it.
In general active attacks can be hard to resist and a balance between the security
measure and cost of a successful attack needs to be found. In this case, a changing
radio link identity in each handover, and the network allocation policy for it, seems
to be a good enough security measure against user or device tracking. The attacker
needs to map the connection with the user ID before tracking can happen. To allow
user tracking based on the signaling messages requires that the attacker is close to
the radio link and thus can also follow the user based on visual contact.
3.1.4 LTE Key Management Comparison with Session Keys Context
Summary and contributions. This paper describes and analyses the LTE secu-
rity architecture and key management. At the time of writing this publication, there
were no other publications describing the LTE security architecture at this detailed
level. The paper compares and quantifies the LTE key management with the Session
Keys Context (see Publication II). The paper also discusses some implementation
alternatives for the LTE key management that maintain the compliancy with the
LTE over-the-air interface specification. This seems to be also the first paper to
discuss the implementation alternatives.
Related art. There are not so many publications on LTE Security yet, since the
specifications are fresh at the moment. This is one reason why this paper goes
through the LTE security architecture at a more detailed level. Prasad et al. (2007)
[101] describe LTE key management and mobility at high level in its early stages
and mainly push for solutions originating from IETF.
Discussion and evaluation. This publication brings together the new author
designed SKC key management mechanism (see Publication II) and the LTE key
management that the author was standardizing. The paper compares these together
and quantifies the results. This publication is the last one in this dissertation.
The paper analyses the LTE key management and SKC together and thus contrasts
the author's contribution to the current cellular network standard. We claim that the
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key management with session keys context would have been simpler than the current
LTE key management. We also claim that the session keys context provides higher
security than LTE key management overall. The X2 handoﬀs in LTE do not provide
forward key separation until two hops, whilst the SKC provides it in all handoﬀ
scenarios. We also claim that SKC would have been better suited for diﬀerent
network deployments and implementation options as it can be easily reduced to a
plain key request mechanism. However, we also acknowledge that SKC brings more
complexity to the KD, and adds requirements on the security associations between
the KD and the APs.
3.2 Symmetric Key Establishment Protocol with Implicit Au-
thentication
3.2.1 Use Cases of Implicit Authentication and Key Establishment with Sender
and Receiver ID Binding
Summary and contributions. The paper explores identity based asymmetric cryp-
tography and applies it with symmetric keys. The paper describes a new key estab-
lishment protocol that provides implicit authentication based on sender ID, receiver
ID, or both sender and receiver ID binding. The paper also provides novel use cases
for the protocol, e.g., creating keys for Operations & Management server clients
from a root key and client identity, and partial IP packet level authentication with
the help of the Domain Name System (DNS) [80, 81].
Related art. The Diﬃe-Hellman (1976) [33] protocol can be seen as the first key
establishment protocol based on public key cryptography. But it does not provide
authentication. Protocols that bind together authentication and key establishment
are called authenticated key establishment (AK) (2005) [34]. Identity based cryp-
tography (IBC) [107] builds on the basic idea that some unique information about
the user is used as the public key (e.g., email address as a string). There are multiple
uses for IBC, like an ID-based encryption, signature, and key exchange applications
[22, 15, 20]. In the IBC based systems each participant needs to know some public
parameters that the keys are based on.
Binding parameters with key derivations functions is a basic building block within
key establishment protocols. Binding additional parameters to the key derivation
with symmetric keys achieves, for example, channel binding (see e.g., [9]) and re-
duces the scope of where the keys can be used. Asokan et al. (2003) [14] describe
man-in-the-middle attacks on tunneled authentication protocols like the HTTP [37]
authentication inside a TLS [32] tunnel. The basic problem is that the authentica-
tion protocol running inside the TLS tunnel is not bound to the keys used in the TLS
tunnel. In other words the two authentications are not bound to each other at the
end points. A solution for this is to require the inner authentication protocol to use
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channel binding and bind the keys to the outer secure tunnel at both end points or
do re-keying for the outer tunnel based on the inner authentication methods result
at both end points.
Shih-I-Huang (2003) [47, 48] presents a simple key derivation based on node identi-
ties for reducing the number of keys needed to be stored in sensors for large sensor
network deployments. The basic idea is that a node derives a key based on a target
node identity and the key it holds. This way the sensor does not have to store the
key for the target node. Chan and Perrig describe a key establishment protocol for
sensor networks called PIKE (2005) [24]. It reduces the keys needed to be stored in
the sensor network to half with the Huang's key derivation method.
Discussion and evaluation. A public key can be readily used to start authenti-
cated and encrypted communications with another party who has the corresponding
secret key (see e.g., PGP [120, 38]). However, the communication initiator needs to
verify that the public key belongs to the recipient. For this purpose a trusted third
party is needed, e.g., a Certificate Authority (CA) that has signed the recipient's
public key. In IBC the recipient's identity is used as a public key and a trusted
third party is needed to get the right system-wide public parameters for public key
creation. The sender and receiver ID binding protocol described in Publication V
requires a trusted third party for each authenticated key establishment protocol run.
But analogically it also works like IBC in the sense that the sender needs to know
only the recipient's identity before starting implicitly authenticated and encrypted
communications.
The protocol described in Publication V does not protect against replay attacks
because there are no freshness parameters that change over consecutive protocol
runs. But this is also similar to what is achieved with public keys. Encrypting a
message with a receiver's public key and sending it to the receiver can be replayed.
For actual session establishment and data protection, the protocol in Publication V
should be extended to support session key negotiation e.g., with exchanged nonces.
This is left for further study.
The described use cases in Publication V are at high level and require a lot more
work for actual implementation and use case validation. This is left for further
study.
This paper contributes to the overall problem statement by showing how the iden-
tity binding can be used eﬀectively to derive keys locally. It is a generalization of
the key derivation and management ideas of session keys context in Publication II
and thus makes the contributions more usable. The two main ideas are identity
binding and providing keys for diﬀerent parties from diﬀerent parts of the key hier-
archy, especially to the communicating parties. This way one peer needs to do more
key derivations than the other peer to get to the same level and leaves in the key
hierarchy tree.
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3.3 Decentralized AAA architecture
3.3.1 Secure Distributed AAA with Domain and User Reputation
Summary and contributions. The paper explores the distribution of a AAA
system to the edges of the network without violating the requirements put on AAA
systems [8]. The publication splits the problem space of decentralized AAA and
addresses these problems separately. Then the paper lists four building blocks that
are used for the AAA system distribution. (1) Hardware assisted security (e.g.,
with Trusted Computing Group's Trusted Platform Module [54] or Mobile Trusted
Module [112, 35], ARM TrustZone [10, 13], TI M-Shield [17]) is used for authenti-
cation purposes and integrity validation, and reputation mechanisms are used for
fine-grained authorization decisions for the usage of the network resources. The sys-
tem is built on top of (2) two kinds of certificates, domain specific and AP specific.
The system also requires (3) AAA backup servers, their discovery and assignment
procedures. Finally, the paper suggests using an (4) overlay network among the APs
for storing the user profiles. The publication also describes four models on how the
certificates can be used to manage control over the system.
Related art. The author, at the time of writing the paper, did not find any other
paper that would have tackled the AAA distribution problem in this way, i.e., by
actually distributing the AAA server functionality to the edges of the network.
Cellular networks like GSM and UMTS distribute authentication vectors [4] to the
visited network so that the visited network can authenticate the user. This is also
called delegated authentication. Thus, the authentication procedure is distributed
from the home network to the visited network and the signaling to the home net-
work is not in the time critical part of the authentication procedure during the
authentication procedure. The home network must trust the visited network before
sending the authentication vectors. Until LTE [67, 5, 44], the MN was not able to
authenticate the visited network, as the authentication vector in GSM and UMTS
is not bound to the visited network identity as in LTE.
Liang and Wang describe a localized AAA control scheme (2004) [68] that allows
the visited network to create a local account for the MN and use it for further
authentications to remove the load from the real home AAA server. This is not
delegated authentication as the visited network becomes like a secondary home
network for the user. From the home network point of view, the home network loses
the capability to control the number of authentications for the user. Also, the visited
network becomes like a secondary home network for the MN, meaning that the MN
needs to know when to use the visited network as a secondary home network. This
increases complexity and changes the trust models between the visited and home
networks.
One of the problems in localized and delegated authentication schemes is that since
the authenticated session is not end-to-end between client and the home AAA server,
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the home network does not automatically know where the user is and when the
user is registered to the network. However, the reachability for the user must be
ensured. In GSM/UMTS/LTE the visited network informs the home network about
the user's location. In Liang and Wang's localized AAA control scheme something
similar needs to be done. In the paper, the distributed AAA architecture is always
end-to-end, meaning that there is no reachability problem for the home AAA server,
as it always knows where the MN is.
Chang et al. (2007) [25] describe a system with Mobile IP that uses session key
sharing between local AAA servers called AAAF. Access networks have multiple
AAAFs, which share the MN specific key between them when the MN moves. This
is similar to cellular networks like GSM and UMTS where the SGSN provides the
ciphering and integrity keys to the next SGSN when MN moves.
Zrelli and Shinoda describe a scheme (2006) [121] that can be used to extend Ker-
beros to support multiple administrative domains. This is similar to the delegated
authentication mechanism, where the home network sends the key to the visited
network that the MN also has, except that the MN gets the session key from the
home network encrypted with the MN specific key when Kerberos is used.
Ngai and Lyu proposed Certificate Authority (CA) distribution (2006) [87] for wire-
less ad-hoc networks for a system where public keys are used to authenticate the
nodes. They also have the concept of CA reputation, similar to our domain reputa-
tion. Their paper also covers the area of CA distribution.
When writing Publication VI, we did not find the following paper from Hecker et
al. (2005) [41]. They propose to use a P2P network to store management data of
a WLAN AP system. Their Configuration Management P2P-based Access Security
System (COMPASS) system does not require any centralized AAA entity. They
require the AP to have a signed certificate and bootstrap address for the overlay
network. They use a Secure CAN (S-CAN) [42] P2P algorithm with a landmark-
ordering method to store data near the APs the data is used with. The WLAN APs
can identify their neighbors and get the corresponding link layer identities, which
are then used to insert the APs close to each other in the CAN network. This way
neighboring APs help each other to store data as they become overlay neighbors
and the data retrieval becomes more eﬃcient.
Hecker et al. basically describe a system that has common ideas with our paper,
i.e., distributed AAA and secure storage of data for the overlay network. This is
encouraging as there are others who have thought about the same problem scope.
Hecker et al. do not describe authentication for MNs, for how mobility is solved
in general, or multiple autonomous domains as we do. They refer to a paper that
describes S-CAN from H.-J. Hof et al. (2004) [42] as a security building block.
S-CAN seems to be a useful building block that our ideas can be built upon as
well. For example, for finding the candidates for slave AAA servers close to the
master AAA server and using the S-CAN secure storage. However, the details are
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left for further study as well as the security analysis and suitability of H.-J. Hof et
al. proposal.
Tchepnda et al. (2008)[113] describe a multi-hop authentication and credential
delivery protocol on layer 2 for vehicular networks based on the EAP authentica-
tion protocol and public key infrastructure. They do not consider the AAA server
distribution; even though their protocol requires many round trips and public key
operations between the client and the AAA server. However, they identified the
need to distribute the security functionality and list it as future work.
It is also worth mentioning here the work of Helayos related to autonomic wireless
networking (2005) [117] and specifically the methods to create large WiFi deploy-
ments working together over IP (2008) [118].
Discussion and evaluation. There are lots of citywide WiFi networks and com-
panies providing infrastructure to build WiFi coverage. These community based
networks like FON [116] and SparkNet [84] can benefit from the results of this pa-
per for reducing the authentication server or gateway costs. As of today, FON is
preparing to integrate GSM femto base stations into the FON wireless access routers.
Their FON router already can host external hard drives and other USB peripherals
and can act as a service client in relation to the Internet (like downloading and
uploading), allowing the user to close other computers in the household. We be-
lieve that the direction in our paper is still a valid and interesting opportunity and
that the FON community shares similar ideas. For example, Alcatel-Lucent has an
UMTS access router that integrates multiple cellular network elements into one box
(2007 - 2009) [19, 21].
The paper addresses the problem of AAA distribution in a constructive way and
shows why the distributed AAA architecture described in the paper fulfills the AAA
system requirements. The certificate models for both protecting the device integrity
and authenticating the domains are also valid. Vendors today use the Internet
to update the software of operating systems and applications. Thus, the vendor
specific device certificate is not a new idea. However, the AAA master and slave
server certificates and their creation or deployment models are new.
The user profile handling and reputation models are described at idea level and
are thus a quite lightweight contribution to the paper. There is no validation or
background information as to whether this kind of reputation model could actually
work in practice.
This paper addresses the distribution part of the problem statement of this disser-
tation. The AAA architecture is distributed to the APs, but each domain still has
a master AAA server and backup AAA server(s). The DNS [71] is used to resolve
the backup and master AAA server addresses, and thus it acts as the entry point
to the AAA system. The novel key management scheme described in Publication II
can be used with this distributed AAA scheme to avoid overloading the master or
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backup AAA servers, and thus actually allows them to be deployed in slower and
less capable edge network nodes like APs (or wireless access routers).
From this dissertation point of view, broadening the scope of distributed AAA to
sensor and vehicular networks would have given more related art to go through. The
problem is that both the vehicular and sensor networks have diﬀerent characteristics
than e.g., non-mobile and always-on APs. But there are some synergies in the area of
authentication and key agreement. On the other hand, the scope of this dissertation
does not cover sensor or ad-hoc networks.
The work in future is to find or create suitable protocols for finding and assigning
slave AAA servers, and then registering them to the DNS automatically. Here the
paper from Hecker et al. is a nice starting point, i.e., using the overlay network
characteristics to find close neighbors.
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4 Discussion
Current situation. There have been many papers and standardization eﬀorts in
the area of key management for fast handovers already many years back, but only
few papers relate to distributing KD and AAA for mobile networks (i.e., not sensor
networks). Many papers concentrate on improving one thing, e.g., handoﬀ eﬃciency
but at the same time do not consider KD scalability or signaling eﬃciency. Some
papers propose very complex combinations of diﬀerent mechanisms in the field but
fail to simplify the overall solution. Complex proposals and combinations in many
cases come from the fact that an existing system cannot be changed, but patched
with minimum eﬀects on the standard (e.g., 802.11). It is important to know the
requirements and possible use cases for a protocol and architecture standard when
it is being developed. Furthermore, we think that designing extensible protocols is
important, but at the same time eﬃcient hardware based implementations must be
possible. From a standardization point of view getting the best overall solution is
hard as there are multiple parties and diﬀering interests.
Thesis publications. The publications in this dissertation form a combination,
but also provide multiple novel research results and topics for further studies. Pub-
lication I is not very significant as a whole in the dissertation, but bootstraps the
research nicely. The most significant papers in this dissertation are Publication II,
V, and VI. They form the core contributions of this dissertation. Publication II
describes the novel SKC key management mechanism, and provides an extensive
comparison with the other three main key management mechanisms (key request,
pre-distribution, and pre-authentication). Publication V takes the ideas in SKC
to a more general level, and describes a novel symmetric key identity based key
agreement protocol. It also provides some interesting use cases for further studies
and evaluation. Publication VI describes the AAA distribution and leverages the
benefits of SKC as a suitable distributed key management mechanism for mobile
networks. Thus, it extends the SKC usability further and shows its potential with
distributed AAA. The last two publications, III and IV, are focused on LTE security
research, which was one of the main tasks of the dissertation author while working
with this dissertation. Publication III describes security weaknesses in LTE and
proposes results related to key management. The last publication concludes the
dissertation by showing the diﬀerences between SKC and LTE key management.
The papers do not overlap each other.
Main results. The SKC is a new key management mechanism that best supports
distributed AAA systems, among the various other key management mechanisms.
It is also the best mechanism to reduce signaling load from the KD and make the
system independent of the AP-KD link delay.
SKC is a significant contribution to mobile key management with fast handoﬀs when
separate keys for APs are required. It supports research for distributed systems and
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more cost eﬃcient network architectures. SKC is one of the key enablers for flatter
architectures as it removes signaling load from the KD and more importantly AP-
KD real-time handoﬀ signaling dependency.
Creating a subscriber specific access controlled mobility area with SKC (AP cover-
age) is a new idea for authorizing mobility and can be used to create new charging
models that are not based on traﬃc, but on location and access area. Usage of the
SKC with mobility patterns and embedding network topology information into the
SKC is new. Adding accounting information etc. into the SKC structure is also new,
but the details require further research as well as how this mechanism can utilize
the overlay networks as a storage.
The receiver and sender ID binding protocol with symmetric keys is new and shows
analogy with Identity Based Cryptography. This is also a generalization of the
identity binding, which the SKC is also using. The use cases for our protocol are
also new and interesting, and can be used for mobile networks. With SKC, for
example, the KD could use this protocol for creating keys to seal the AP specific
MN's session keys in the SKC. However, the protocol itself does not prohibit replay
attacks as it is stateless in nature and mimics the asymmetric key cryptography
possibility, where the sender can use the receiver's public key to send encrypted
information. Replay protection must be taken care of and analyzed separately. This
is left for further study.
Our distributed AAA paper shows that with SKC, certificates, and a hardware based
security mobile network, KD can be distributed to the edge nodes (APs) that do not
have fast or fat pipes to the Internet. Distributed AAA is one application area for the
SKC, but the details require further research and validation. Our distributed AAA
architecture is also a simple and novel approach, but requires further validation and
analysis. For example the slave AAA selection is not well described and analyzed,
but we envisage that there are multiple alternatives for doing this by looking at the
p2p algorithms. This is a further research topic.
Our quantitative analysis and comparison of SKC and LTE key management is new
and not seen before. Also, the discussion on diﬀerent implementation alternatives
for LTE Security is new, although we think that many vendors do this extensively
internally during standardization, implementation, and deployment for diﬀerent cus-
tomers.
Learning. SKC did not make it to the LTE. Neither did all the solutions proposed
in Publication III that lists security weaknesses in the LTE link layer. However,
at a very late stage the requirements of the LTE key management were changed
to match with SKC, but at that time the key management protocol was already
specified and going back was not possible. The LTE key management was patched
with a forward key separation that made it closer to the key request type of protocol
and much more dependent on AP-KD delay for each handoﬀ than it was. In LTE,
the KD is integrated with the Mobility Management Entity (MME) that takes care
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of the location updates from the APs and thus AP-KD delay dependency is not
that critical. However, the KD functionality increases the MME load and memory
consumption and prevents implementing eﬃcient link layer specific mobility update
procedures with multiple base stations, unless less secure horizontal key derivations
are used without path switches (i.e., location updates).
LTE base stations have security implementation requirements for the first time in
3GPP history. This reflects the increased trend towards flatter architectures and AP
deployments in physically insecure locations (e.g., home base stations, home eNBs).
This also shows that our research had the right direction and that its contribution
is serious input for the future of mobile networks.
Opinions and predictions. As we concluded in the last publication, LTE security
is complex and with the SKC would have been a simpler and more eﬃcient system.
Disruptive thinking may move the key management load to the edges of the network
and thus separate key management and mobility signaling. The KD on the other
hand moves towards the core network where it is physically more secure and intra-
system mobility happens mostly within the link layer [61].
Femto and home base stations, femto gateways, and WLAN access routers may
benefit from having something to do with the extra capacity (updating SKC, calcu-
lating and optimizing mobility patterns). Relevant research areas for our contribu-
tions also include cloud computing and virtualization, municipal/community based
Wi-Fi, and the development of home base stations with security implementation
requirements. The distributed AAA system can be seen as a cloud of AAA servers
that work together to minimize the eﬀects of link delays, server outages, and reach-
ability problems. Our distributed AAA is a direct contribution to the municipal
and community based Wi-Fi development as well. Security hardening in base sta-
tions with certificates and hardware-based security provides new opportunities for
collaborative and distributed systems.
4.1 Summary
We studied how mobile network key management and authentication negatively
aﬀect handoﬀ performance, increases time critical overhead in the handoﬀ, and
adds overhead to the system in terms of key exchange signaling, authentication, and
key distribution. At the same time we wanted to improve the eﬃciency of the key
management subsystem by reducing investment pressure on core network elements.
We addressed these problems with success.
Our novel SKC key management mechanism best supports distributed AAA systems
among other key management mechanisms. It is the best mechanism to reduce sig-
naling load from the KD and make the system independent of the AP-KD link delay.
SKC is a significant contribution to the mobile key management with fast handoﬀs
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when separate keys for APs are required. It supports research for distributed sys-
tems and more cost eﬃcient mobile network architectures. Our novel receiver and
sender ID binding with symmetric keys is a new protocol and shows analogy with
Identity Based Cryptography. This is also a generalization of the identity binding
that SKC is using. The use cases for our protocol are also new and interesting,
and can be used for mobile networks. Our distributed AAA paper proposes a new
architecture that with SKC, certificates, and hardware based security makes it fea-
sible to distribute the mobile network KD to the edge nodes (APs) that do not
have fast or fat pipes to the Internet. Distributed AAA is one application area for
the SKC and the details require further research and validation. Our quantitative
analysis and comparison of SKC and LTE key management is new and not seen be-
fore. Also, the discussion on diﬀerent implementation alternatives for LTE Security
is new, although we think that many vendors do this extensively internally during
standardization, implementation, and deployment for diﬀerent customers.
SKC is a contribution to the mobile key management with fast handoﬀs in the typical
case where separate keys for APs are required. It supports distributed systems and
more cost eﬃcient network architectures. SKC is one of the key enablers for flatter
architectures as it removes signaling load from the KD and more importantly AP-
KD real-time handoﬀ signaling dependency. Our new sender and receiver identity
binding symmetric key protocol is an optimization mechanism for key management
in general and supports the SKC key management for mobile networks.
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